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Harold Wilson is reputed to have remarked that, in politics, two weeks is 
a long time. Looking forward five, ten and even fifteen years is obviously an 
elusive enterprise. But it is not an unprofitable enterprise, and its 
meaningfulness in relation to plausible political and security scenarios of 
the Pacific island scene, more or less as of the year 2000, is particularly 
apropos. It is apropos because it deals with a regional setting whose 
international significance is increasingly recognized, yet which is highly 
susceptible to outside power influence, and for the time continues to define 
and shape its own personality. 
The present assessment undertakes to anticipate outside power political 
and security effects by applying categories of analysis that coincide with the 
island countries' own perceived, dominant concerns. To begin, however, some 
special attributes of the Pacific island region should be noted, since they 
impose more than usual difficulties on efforts to make confident projections. 
At least three, distinctive features that typify the Pacific island 
community invite special caution in forecasting the region's middle range 
future. The first refers to decision-making style within the island 
countries. The resident countries are small with disproportionately modest 
and relatively unspecialized bureaucratic establishments. There in other 
words is not much by way of independently gathered intelligence data, 
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analytical expertise or breadth of applied experience that can be passed to 
political decision-makers. Political parties do not themselves enjoy much 
institutionalized autonomy which otherwise could enable them to influence the 
judgments of political elites. The senior political elites operate in 
contexts of substantial personalized authority, and often are second or still 
first generation national leaders, with wide national visibility and following. 
The upshot is highly individualized decision-making in the Pacific 
islands. Since this condition is not likely to change much in the next ten or 
fifteen years, the region will remain governed in a manner conSiderably less 
routinized, less subject to institutional constraints and therefore less 
predictable than would obtain in more established and complex political 
systems. The intangibles surrounding leadership styles and programmatic 
preferences among the region1s remaining non-independent entities, especially 
those under French control, further obscure efforts at determining 
foreshadowed political behavior, and thereby regional-outside power relation 
outcomes. 
A second factor complicating confident scenario-building refers to various 
intraregional characteristics. Hence, the greater South Pacific region, or 
Oceania, can be construed as a series of subsets as well as a greater region 
in itself. The Melanesian/Micronesian/Polynesian distinction is more than 
cultural. The Melanesians for instance represent the most populous group, 
thereby engendering unease elsewhere as to their possible interest in or 
capacity to dominate South Pacific affairs. Overall, the Melanesians have 
emerged as the most politically militant on international questions. Until 
now most of the South Pacific Forum members have represented a British-New 
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Zealand-Australian colonial background. Consensus has arguably been easier 
than it will be toward the end of the century when there will be more 
independent regional entities, and the newcomers will be of French and 
American colonial/administrative derivation. In other words, the region will 
become more, not less, politically diverse, fragmented and complex, and 
outside powers will find it more difficult to anticipate its behavior and to 
respond to it. 
The subtheme of this phenomenon is that interstate rivalries within the 
region will likely accentuate, beyond the kind of jostling exemplified by 
aspects of PNG-Fiji relations. The reasons for increased interstate rivalry 
could include maneuvering for leadership, widening differences in political 
orientation or in preindependence heritage (for instance the behavior of a 
postindependence New Caledonia), the susceptibilities of regional countries to 
more intense, outside power blandishments, or regional country apprehensions 
about outside power reprisals against offending policies. The latter point 
has been intimated regarding Fiji's periodic reluctance to offend France, lest 
France influence EEC policies that could undermine Fiji's sugar market. 
Domestic disturbances in the island countries could of course severely 
discommode some of the most carefully laid predictions about the region's 
politics. One of the more obvious circumstances would entail social disorder 
over the political future of the French territories. The effects would be 
felt among neighboring states as well as the actual sites of commotion. In 
case of trouble in New Caledonia, there would be especially profound effects 
on Vanuatu's approach. And, in the last resort, conflict in established, 
sovereign nations cannot be entirely discounted; for example plural society 
24 
tensions in Fiji or secessionist unrest in PNG. Apart from impact on the 
political integrity of such affected nations, serious civil disturbances could 
distract or even incapacitate those nations in respect to their normal role as 
Pacific island community actors. 
A final caution about forecasting conditions in the South Pacific refers 
to outside rather than to resident states. Even assuming that there is no 
overt breakdown in the central balance, or regionally, the essential point is 
that many of the interested outside powers are latecomers to approaching the 
South Pacific region as a whole. They may have had a historically distant 
political presence (e.g., Japan); or they may focus mainly on one segment of 
the region (e.g., the US vis-a-vis Micronesia and the special case of American 
Samoa); or they may have been present for some time but without being 
especially mindful of wider, transregional political/security implications of 
their policies (e.g., France); or they have been rebuffed and to date unable 
to establish a meaningful foothold (e.g., the Soviet Union); or like the ASEAN 
nations they have simply been preoccupied with Southeast Asian affairs and 
have paid little heed to the South Pacific. At bottom, recency, indifference, 
lack of access or other limiting circumstances have prevented a number of 
outside powers from crystallizing and practicing policies that are well honed 
and truly in place. Until such crystallization becomes more evident, outside 
power behavior will be more volatile, or at least more tentative and 
experimental, than those searching for confident projections for the region 
might prefer. 
As a group, the Pacific island countries are economically weak, dependent 
and vulnerable. As populations grow, there is little to compensate through 
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indigenously generated wealth. Most have no industries to speak of. Most 
rely on one or two cash crops or catches. Only PNG and New Caledonia contain 
known natural resources of international market consequence. Pacific country 
EEZ (exclusive economic zones) seabeds have to date not yielded optimistic 
forecasts of natural wealth. The more important companies operating in the 
islands are foreign. The region's trade is only inCidentally intramural. It 
instead flows beyond, predominantly to former or continuing metropolitan 
powers - theANZUS countries, Japan and France. The island countries are 
moreover deeply dependent on outside power technical assistance and a host of 
civil aid measures. We are reminded that PNG, the region's largest and in 
respects most economically viable member, has for years had its ongoing 
budgetary requirements lavishly subSidized by Australia. 
These economic circumstances are familiar, but warrant underscoring for 
purpose of their forseeable political effects. The guiding assumption is 
that, within ten or fifteen years, these circumstances will not materially 
change. The island countries will remain poor and sorely dependent. They 
will not be able to dispense with a sizeable outside power presence, in aid 
form or otherwise. The question therefore is who will likely be providing 
such economic backup, and with what political implications. 
Probably the most plausible forecast is that it is the western outside 
powers that will continue their dominant economic roles. One explanation is 
simply that of habit; recipient countries will continue what has become 
familiar and for the most part has not been overbearing. A second reason is 
that some of the alternatives will probably remain politically unpalatable. 
The Soviets are not welcome politically, are regarded as strangers, and are 
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part of a perceived great power rivalry that could flare up if they were 
allowed greater economic access to the region. Australia's and in degree New 
Zealand's panicked reaction in 1976 to the prospect of Soviet aid to Tonga and 
Western Samoa in exchange for certain facilities will surely remain in the 
consciousness of regional countries. These countries can expect to extract 
more assistance from the ANZUS powers, but credibly cannot afford to push them 
to the brink of alienation. The Chinese are more benignly regarded than are 
the Soviets and have relatively little to offer. But their persistence in 
matching or checkmating Soviet initiatives is theatre that island countries 
will not wish to encourage. 
Carried thus far, our scenario has the strong inference, that, continuing 
in their pervasive regional economic role, outside powers will continue to 
exercise disproportionate political influence. This will likely be the fact, 
but with some variations on prevailing trends being possible and even likely. 
First, the balance between and among donor nations could well shift, 
carrying corresponding political overtones. The subregionalization of aid 
programs is already moving away from the conventional practice of Australia 
being preeminently active in Melanesia, New Zealand in Polynesia and the U.S. 
in Micronesia. So as not to become overdependent on a single donor, PNG 
welcomes New Zealand aid, and Western Samoa welcomes Australian aid. Given 
its far greater resources, Australia already outstrips New Zealand in the 
amount of money it injects into the Pacific island countries, even if 
assistance to PNG is discounted. New Zealand's endemic economic troubles 
could easily contribute to a widening of the gap. After a time, the 
disparities might reach such an order of magnitude that New Zealand's 
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political weight in the region could perceptibly recede. If for sake of 
discussion successive governments in Australia continue to stand closely with 
the United States on regional security issues while New Zealand becomes a kind 
of odd man out in ANZUS, or indeed if de facto or de jure ANZUS is 
reconstituted without New Zealand, from a general western point of view New 
Zealand's relative economic - and by indirection political - retraction in the 
region might not be lamented. 
There are some other calculations to be made, including those involving 
the United States. Apart from its substantial economic commitments to the 
Micronesian territories, the U.S. has only very light aid programs directed at 
the island countries. These programs are in fact of a volunteer and indirect 
character. Should various congressional and other advice prevail and the U.S. 
were to adopt straightforward, bilateral aid programs toward the islands much 
of the present, regional aid/politics equation would shift. If the U.S. 
instituted aid programs of any significance in countries previously served 
mostly by Australia and New Zealand it probably would run the risk of sooner 
or later offending Canberra and Wellington at least on complaints of turf and 
precedent. Probably more importantly, as a newcomer donor who also happened 
to be a great power without satisfactory, pan-regional credentials, the U.S. 
could become embroiled in controversies with recipient countries in ways that 
the Australians and New Zealanders do not precipitate. 
Whatever any forthcoming U.S. aid role in countries presently dominated by 
Australian and New Zealand aid programs, a prospective American role in 
presently French controlled territories could produce a different set of 
political outcomes. Assuming that New Caledonia and/or French Polynesia will 
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have moved to independent or virtually independent status roughly by the year 
2000, it would not be improbable that American commercial interests would take 
a keen interest and that official aid would be proferred. This is said with 
the acknowledgement that former French territories world-wide have for the 
most part maintained close cultural and economic ties with France. The French 
themselves might nevertheless prefer to facilitate an American economic 
presence, perhaps as a form of counterpoint to political influence from New 
Zealand and Australia, the island community's closest western friends and who 
will probably continue to be much more publicly critical of French regional 
policies than will the U.S. 
In the last resort, however economic assistance from outside powers is 
allocated, by the turn of the century the island countries are likely to be 
more feisty about their dependence on such aid and the quid pro quo of their 
political good behavior that they might infer as that being the price expected 
by donors. Or, even if few such inferences are drawn, there will be the 
simple sense of national pride. Already, from various Pacific island 
quarters, have come protestations about Australia and New Zealand playing Big 
Brother, about their undue influence in regional councils, and about the need 
for non-island states to be more sensitive to that somewhat amorphous notion 
of The Pacific Way. 
Defense assistance and protection for island countries can also be 
foreseen as having a more troubled passage by end of century than currently 
obtains. It is well to remember that, even apart from various defense 
cooperation programs, the Pacific island community is substantially covered by 
some form, literal or implied, of outside, western power defense protection. 
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The French territories remain garrisoned by French forces. American Samoa 
will foreseeab1y remain in the U.S. hands and falls directly under the 
American defense mantle. Neighboring Western Samoa has at various times by 
extension been construed as falling within the ANZUS ambit. New Zealand 
retains explicit defense responsibility for the Cook Islands, Tokelau and 
Niue. The U.S. will continue to exercise treaty-linked influence over the use 
of abandoned defense facilities in Tuvalu and Kiribati into the 1990 1s. U.S. 
arrangements for control over the defense of Micronesian territories will 
continue into the 21st century. Australia has no formal commitment to defend 
PNG, but traditional connections and informal understandings impose special 
responsibilities on it. 
It is also well to recall that the ANZUS partnership is welcome throughout 
most of the Pacific island region, and that several island countries have over 
time indicated interest in becoming associated with the alliance in some 
form. TheANZUS nations have sensibly demurred, both because of what such 
additions would do to the integrity and intimacy of ANZUS, and because such 
steps could aggravate regional great power rivalry. 
All the same, outside, western power contributions to regional country 
defense arrangements face more rather than fewer complications in the years to 
come. Even if no local emergencies arise and assistance from protecting 
outside powers is not invoked, sensitivity - indeed hypersensitivity - about 
outside power military intentions is likely to become more standard fare in 
the region. A recent example is the exclamation of a former PNG foreign 
minister that New Zealand's proposed armed forces reconfiguration to enhance 
rapid deployment was an ominous sign of "gunboat diplomacy" in the South 
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Pacific. Another example is the apprehension in the Solomons particularly 
that the U.S. military action in Grenada could quite literally presage 
American gunboat diplomacy in the South Pacific when the U.S. found itself in 
some dispute with a tiny and defenseless regional country. 
It is not likely that the formal or implied outside power defense 
commitments to island countries will need to be invoked against the major 
communist powers. This does not however imply that the region's defense 
security will be carefree. The prospect of an overt clash between Indonesia 
and PNG over Irian Jaya border problems lingers. The Indonesians would not 
appear to have any interest in aggravating their Irian Jaya troubles by 
chewing off parts of PNG and, inter alia, thereby prospectively having to deal 
with Australia. Since no skirmishing on the border beyond a low level is 
likely, Australia will not need to make a hard choice between "defending" PNG, 
and maintaining its special Indonesian relationship. The trend that 
Indonesia's continuing scrapping with PNG could accelerate, however, is that 
Indonesia would continue to forfeit opportunities to become the principal 
bridge between the ASEAN and Pacific island communities. The Malaysians would 
then probably continue to develop the principal ASEAN presence, with political 
influence following economic involvement. 
But, whether the motive is to create a fire brigade for regionwide 
deployment, or somehow to remind potential, outside nation governments such as 
the Indonesian or the French that the island community will not be 
intimidated, a multinational regional force such as Julius Chan once 
recommended has no serious prospect of success. The smaller regional states 
would only become more apprehensive about bigger power (e.g., PNG) 
31 
aspirations. After all, among the island countries, only PNG, Fiji and Tonga 
have armed forces as such, only the first two have any meaningful capability, 
and PNG's is by far greater than Fiji's. Second, in part because of the 
existing or foreseeably continuing network of outside power defense 
commitments, these same powers will continue to be averse to encouraging 
regional military fire brigades whose composition and utilization could lead 
to an obfuscation of the assumed terms of existing protective aprons and 
defense pledges. An action such as PNG's assistance, with Australian backup, 
to suppress the rebellion on Espiritu Santo on Vanuatu could, as an ad hoc 
event, conceivably be repeated. Even in the Santo case, however, Fiji's nose 
was somewhat bent out of joint over how PNG comported itself. In sum, little 
embellishment to standing features of defense cooperation and protection is in 
prospect. 
The Pacific island community is devoted to the principle of eliminating or 
containing great power rivalry within the region. Being small, frail and far 
removed from the centers of international competition, the resident countries 
wish to avoid becoming pawns or victims. Their means to accomplish this are 
not however straight and easy, and very likely will become more difficult as 
uncomfortable policy dilemmas are imposed. 
The issue of limitation of great power rivalry in the region can be 
approached from both diplomatic and defense vantage points. The first 
dimension entails choices of diplomatic representation and of membership in 
international movements or in blocs and alliances. The recent diplomatic 
pattern in the region is quite straightforward. Western nations and 
especially Australia and New Zealand are the most visible among outside powers 
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in terms of residential diplomatic representation. The U.S. on its part is 
stepping up its own regional representation. The Soviets lack any residential 
representation, while the Chinese are present in PNG, Fiji and in Western 
Samoa. 
The western and especially ANZ predominance is easily explained. 
Australia's and New Zealand's geographic proximity, prior and largely benign 
colonial connections, high level aid programs, innate interest in the region, 
and the personal ties and moderate politics of regional elites all add up. 
The Soviets have been rebuffed because in large measure their situation is the 
reverse of Australia's and New Zealand's regional assets, because their 
invited presence would itself inspire great power rivalry in the region, and 
lastly because of ANZUS nation advice that Moscow be kept out. The Chinese 
have been able to establish some entree because they have not been perceived 
to be as menacing as the Soviets (and indeed behave as friends of the west), 
and because, after initial doubts, the outside western powers raised no 
objection. Vanuatu's case is to date aberrant. As a matter of professed 
neutrality and evenhandedness, no recognition has been extended either to the 
U.S. or to the Soviet Union. Vanuatu has also stirred controversy by 
establishing nonresident relations with Cuba, and has become the only regional 
nation to join the Non-aligned Movement. 
Looking ahead toward the end of the century, the existing general pattern, 
with Vanuatu as the exception, would appear to have reasonable but not 
sanguine prospects to survive. A continuingly elusive variable will be the 
outlooks and political temper of the succeeding generation of regional 
elites. More substantively, the regional pattern could well be disturbed, and 
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there would be "more Vanuatus," or diplomatic proclivities even more extreme 
than Vanuatu's, if the French territories are beset by commotion and then 
emerge with a bruised and angry governing elite that holds little sentimental 
brief for the west. There also is the Chinese factor. Chinese influence, and 
the regional countries' political receptivity of China, will probably either 
be as much as it is now - low key and of little direct impact - or tilting 
toward negative. China's regional role is largely a transposition of its 
dispute with the Soviets. Hence China supports a western political and 
security presence in the South Pacific. In so doing it essentially confirms 
western country regional preferences. But China's anti-Sovietism, which 
dominates its desire to preempt or counteract the Soviets, is to repeat a form 
of major power rivalry transferred to the region. That is an unwelcome notion 
in the region, and its manifestation could spillover and prompt resident 
countries to review their prevailing, essentially pro-western aligned stance. 
In this sense, because of the way it is carried out, China's pro-western 
approach in the region could by indirection be injurious to western interests. 
The comment regarding the plainly pro-western orientation of most Pacific 
island countries leads into the rather more complex issue of outside power 
defense entitlements. Nuclear considerations apart, the basic question is 
whether these western privileges are likely to be challenged as being out of 
keeping with avowed regional interests that stress an escape from major power 
rivalries. Two related perspectives can be applied to this question. The 
first addresses the prospect of the introduction of a non-western military 
presence in or around the island countries. The second addresses prospects 
facing the retention of existing western defense facilities, or the 
introduction of new ones. 
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It is well to bear in mind that the fundamental, western power rationale 
in the area is strategic denial, specifically vis-a-vis the USSR. The island 
countries do appreciate this consideration, but as a regional matter rather 
than as the local manifestation of the global context of great power 
competition. Their perception is that the success of strategic denial means 
exclusion of Soviet footholds and thereby exclusion of intraregional 
competition for political and security advantage. For the time being they do 
not view the preponderance of western power as in itself provocative toward 
the Soviets, and thereby as regionally destablizing. As with diplomatic 
policies, the survival of these attitudes will depend heavily on the next 
generation of elites. But certain special events may intervene. Again, an 
agitated process of decolonization in the French territories could tempt an 
attitude of a curse-on-both-great-power-camp-hauses. While the point is 
stretched, Vanuatu might continue to flirt with such notions as allowing 
Soviet naval visits, and an independent New Caledonia might become equally 
unsporting toward western powers and their interests. In a dozen or fifteen 
years, the U.S. in particular might regard such prospects - not just realities 
- with utmost gravity. The reason is that if the strategic balance in the 
western Pacific were to shift away from the U.S. and its allies, if the 
Philippine bases became untenable, then the strategic lines of communication 
leading southward from the eastern edge of Micronesia, into the vicinity of 
Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and New Caledonia, down into the Tasman Sea and 
round the southern coast of Australia would receive more active attention. It 
would be an open question whether the United States would press Kiribati and 
Tuvalu hard to renew the then-expiring treaty clauses designed to keep 
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unwanted third parties out, and to continue arrangements for possible U.S. 
return to abandoned defense facilities. It would also be an open question 
whether in such circumstances the U.S. would exert uncommonly firm pressure to 
insure that Vanuatu and New Caledonia did not permit Soviet interposition. If 
only for the sake of argument, such American pressure, even in a cause the 
remainder of island countries regard as sensible, could offend their 
sensibilities about big power heavyhandedness, and thereby reduce western 
political standing generally. 
The possible loss or degradation of American naval and air bases in the 
Philippines would be a powerful political as well as strategic blow to the 
U.S. For a host of reasons, reconstituting such facilities in Japan or in 
Western Australia would be unfeasible. Despite depreciation of effectiveness 
and the costs involved, the only alternative would be relocation on Guam, and 
very likely the reactiviation of facilities on Tinian and Saipan in the 
Northern Marianas. The U.S. might also find it militarily expedient to 
increase its presence in the Micronesian entities now heading for 
independence, and especially to invoke clauses in its arrangements with Palau 
for contingency use of military reservations. 
Guam and the Northern Marianas are American territory. The Micronesian 
territories will be independent states, freely associated with the U.S. for 50 
years, well beyond the year 2000. These considerations are not immaterial, 
but they could come to lose much of their meaning. should a major U.S. 
strategic shift into Micronesia be undertaken. Right or wrong, peoples on the 
affected land masses could protest. Their governments, which will be included 
in regional councils such as the South Pacific Forum, could raise an alarm. 
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The South Pacific regional countries could well perceive the whole American 
enterprise as chilling reminder of what great powers do when it suits them, 
including introducing military might more squarely into the region and 
conceivably prompting a Soviet riposte. The U.S. and other western powers 
would however probably swallow island country displeasure and loss of 
political welcome as the price of salvaging vital military capabilities west 
of Hawaii. 
The nuclear factor overlaps military basing and weapons systems issues. 
The island community has a collective abhorrence for things nuclear. The 
Americans tested nuclear weapons in Micronesia for years. The French continue 
to do so Mururoa, and have indicated they would probably be proceeding for 
another fifteen years - i.e., until about 2000. China has tested ICBM 
delivery vehicles in the area, and the U.S. continues to do so. Problems 
associated with nuclear waste disposal exercise the island countries. As 
nuclear armed U.S. vessels and occasional Soviet attack submarines ply the 
South Pacific waters, the resident countries are unnerved by the prospect of 
nuclear weapons being employed in anger in the region. 
The middle-range future suggests three ways in which nuclear related 
contingencies could affect the region's political and strategic development. 
One is French testing, which will apparently continue regardless of who 
governs in PariS, and of how strongly the island countries complain. The 
island community's disapproval of France is compounded by dissatisfaction with 
its regional decolonization process. The net effect will likely be more, and 
more severe, attacks heaped on France on both fronts. In the course of these 
attacks the island countries could find themselves frustrated by absence of 
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equal fervor on the part of Australia and New Zealand, which are members of 
the South Pacific regional structure and among the area's most influential 
partners. Similarly, the telescoping of French nuclear testing and 
deco10nization policies could incrementally contribute to political radicalism 
in the region, further upsetting relations with the ANZUS nations. 
A second, nuclear-related domain of contention surrounds proposals for a 
regional nuclear-free zone (NFZ). If adopted, a zone of the type proposed by 
Australia at the 1984 South Pacific Forum meetings would in and of itself have 
little bearing on island country-outside power relations. Prospective 
injunctions against nuclear proliferation, nuclear testing, and nuclear waste 
disposal suit nearly everyone, including most outside powers. Freedom of the 
high seas would not be restricted under an NFZ scheme, and each regional 
nation would decide for itself whether it would allow port visits to outside 
power naval units without reference to their armament or propulsion. The U.S. 
and France would not in any event realistically be expected to accede to 
denuclearizing their own regional territories, namely Guam and French 
PolyneSia, in the face of some hortatory Forum proclamation. 
A potential problem would however seem to lie below rather than on the 
surface of such an NFZ proposal. Since the original, 1975 regional zone 
scheme was adumbrated, a key lesson has been that a great deal of what 
transpires depends on the interest, initiative and pleasure of Australia and 
New Zealand. Until mid-1984 the two ANZAC partners essentially harmonized 
their positions. The election of Labour to office in New Zealand in July 1984 
constituted a major change in New Zealand nuclear matters, both as they 
pertain to ANZUS alliance affairs and in regard to the outlying South Pacific 
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community. Two related consequences are possible. With New Zealand and 
Australia out of synchronization, the island community countries will have 
less firm guidance than in past, thus rendering the regional decision-making 
process, and an approach to consensus-building, more complicated. It could 
also aggravate differences toward the west and nuclear matters specifically 
already manifest among regional members, as for instance between Vanuatu and 
Fiji. Moreover, assuming the New Zealand government's position remains fixed, 
its displeasure with things nuclear could, even in the face of Australian 
objection, induce wider anti-nuclear sentiment among island countries. This 
could mean holding out for tougher NFZ terms or, following New Zealand's 
example, as a matter of national choice refusing to accept visits by nuclear 
powered or armed' vessels. The current user of such privileges in selected 
island countries is the U.S. The loss of occasional port visit opportunities 
in the current South Pacific context would be of little practical 
consequence. But pressures could be exerted on or within the new Micronesian 
entities to forbid such visits. Should this arise, the implications for 
U.S.-Micronesian relations would be most unpleasant, espeCially in light of 
prospective military prerogatives that the U.S. Will. be enjoying there. 
Moreover, speculations about the Micronesian territories aside, a combined New 
Zealand-South Pacific island nation boycott of American ship visits would make 
it more awkward for Australian governments, especially Australian labor party 
governments, to maintain currently hospitable ship visit policies, and could 
carryover into the domain of existing American defense installations on 
Australian territory. Access to Australia is of dramatically greater 
strategic importance to the U.S. than is access to New Zealand or to the South 
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Pacific islands. Hence the spillover effect from the context of a regional 
NFZ, with New Zealand's conduct indicating ANZUS nation discord and tempting 
island countries to follow in kind, could contribute to a profound change in 
the regional security equation. 
The third, nuclear-related scenario brings us back to American defense 
connections with the Micronesian territories. The U.S. does not have nor does 
it contemplate bases as such in the emerging entities. But, even if basing 
problems in the Philippines do not cause the U.S. to invoke contingency 
facility use in the Micronesian areas outside Guam and the Northern Marianas, 
the prospect of heightened local displeasure with a U.S. presence cannot be 
discounted. Whether any such criticism could impair U.S. access is 
problematical. But there already are such precedents as a mass sit-in by the 
Marshall Islanders at the missile testing range at Kwajalein as an assertion 
of land rights, and coordination between Micronesian and French territory 
movements seeking not only independence but comprehensive, regional 
denuclearization. 
Decolonization is another, major political theme that preoccupies the 
Pacific island countries. Both the U.S.-associated Micronesian entities and 
the French territories remain unevolved into independence, but it is the 
latter that really offends regional sensibilities. Resentment of France is of 
course magnified by criticisms of its nuclear testing program. Since France 
has indicated that the testing program will last another fifteen years, it is 
not unlikely to consider an act of self-determination in Polynesia before the 
turn of the century. Indigenous independence sentiment is to be sure weaker 
there than in New Caledonia. In New Caledonia, the French have promised 
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self-determination by 1989. But the indigenous independence parties wish to 
hasten the process and have threatened to boycott interim elections and other 
territorial events. 
The combination of New Caledonian independence party impatience, public 
goading of France by South Pacific island countries and by Vanuatu 
particularly, the complex ethnic composition of New Caledonia and France's own 
economic and political interests there could well become combustible. The 
French themselves have warned of something on the order of a white "Rhodesian" 
outcome if French authority were retracted and radical, indigenous movements 
tried to force their way to power, with bitterness and bloodshed the result. 
Such a scenario aside, it is well to recall that New Caledonia has already 
been disrupted by political violence. More commotion is the likely prognosis. 
A critical consideration is that if New Caledonia is to undergo a sharply 
divisive political transition, and then be governed by Kanaka elites who were 
radicalized in the independence movement, there would be considerably wider 
implications for the region. Militant champions of New Caledonian 
independence, such as Vanuatu, could then be found working with new, regional 
ideological friends rather than remaining a distinct minority within the South 
Pacific community. If only to escape isolation and labels of political 
reaction, other, more moderate island countries could in the meantime have 
been thrust into tough-minded positions. The entire community could in fact 
undergo a tilt toward a more assertive, radical and possibly anti-western 
posture, especially if it was felt that outside western powers had let the 
community down on the New Caledonian issue. 
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A politically radical New Caledonia could feature such measures as 
allowing Soviet diplomatic representation and civil aid, and generally being 
unsympathetic toward western interests. There already have been intimations 
that the Kanak Socialist Independence Front has been establishing links with 
Libya. New Caledonia's geostrategic location would add to misgivings in ANZUS 
capitals as well as in Beijing and in Tokyo. It is also possible that 
anti-colonial momentum generated over New Caledonia would spillover into 
Micronesia. While the U.S. would likely have foresaken its United 
Nations-sponsored, strategic trust political control by the time of New 
Caledonia's independence, the prospective terms of treaties with the 
Micronesian entities could easily be turned on as forms of lingering 
colonialism, inherently unequal and forCibly extracted. Given the strategic 
stakes involved, the United States would not wish to comtemplate a revision of 
the defense terms of the treaties, whether the pressures to do so were of 
local or of broader, Pacific island community origin. The potential 
radicalization of an independent New Caledonia would be disincentive, not 
incentive, to surrender American rights over the Micronesian entities' 
external affairs, or access to defense facilities. 
These speculations about the South Pacific region's future have focused on 
political and strategic themes, primarily as identified by member countries 
themselves, and with particular reference to great power interplay. With all 
the requisite caution about foreseeing conditions at the turn of the century, 
it would appear that the political and strategic format in the region will be 
somewhat different, and more unsettled and troubled than it is today. Outside 
powers will themselves have substantially contributed to the shape of things 
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to come. Their capacity for political management in the region will have been 
attenuated. Vis-a-vis one another, they will not likely be in the kind of 
virtual state of stasis that has characterized the past years. 
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